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Emerging out of  a think tank, convened between 2010 and 2012, Pierre Dardot 
and Christian Laval’s Common: On Revolution in the 21st Century, first published in 
French in 2014, offers a theoretical consolidation of  the political principles implicit 
in the different commoning movements that have arisen since the 1990s. It forwards, 
they attest, “a new reason of  the common” (9), capable of  “overthrowing” con-
temporary neoliberal “norms” (2) that seek to effectively “metabolize reality itself ” 
(87).  
Following a short Introduction that posits a contemporary ‘tragedy of  the 
non-common’ against Garrett Hardin’s persistently influential but discredited 
‘tragedy of  the commons,’ Dardot and Laval divide their book’s content into three 
parts totaling nineteen chapters. The first chapter, “Archaeology of  the Common,” 
stands on its own. It makes a case for a universal conception of  ‘the common,’ 
grounded in a praxis of  human co-activity. The true ‘common,’ they ultimately elab-
orate, is any non-proprietary resource, created “through the transformation of  that 
which already exists” (326), that is governed by moral rules, social practices, or legal 
norms, determined through constructive conflict (217) as much as through coop-
erative decision making, by those who govern and use and maintain it. It is, fur-
thermore, legalized or ‘instituted,’ as “the common is first and foremost a matter 
of  law, and therefore a determination of  what must be. The challenge...is to sub-
stitute a new law by rejecting the claims of  the old law. In this sense...it is a con-
frontation of  law against law” (155). Dardot and Laval’s conception of  ‘the common’ 
is distinguished as much by what it is not or cannot be, as by what it is or must be. 
In this respect most ‘leftists’ or ‘progressives’ will regard their reasons for denying 
‘common’ status to certain candidates as sound, among them: rent-based ‘corporate 
commons’ (119-133); Marxist notions of  “the objective production of  the common 
by capital” (51); the idea that some forms of  knowledge or information are inher-
ently ‘common’ (107, 112); or the insistence that ‘the common’ is “immanent to the 
social” (155), or otherwise ontological (189) or existential (190).  
Potentially contentious may be their further denials of  ‘common’ status 
to English common or customary law, which remains the purview of  elite experts 
who select laws based on their compatibility with the principle and practice of  pri-
vate property (155-156), or to reifications of  things whose natures are held to be 
inherently ‘common’ (11-12, 20), or to certain technologies considered in themselves 
to possess qualities or capacities for reorganizing society (118). Also controversial 
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will be their unorthodox but well-reasoned denial of  ‘common’ status to the cate-
gory or institution of  ‘the public,’ to the extent that both continue to be defined in 
contradistinction to ‘the private’ (93) and to the extent that both remain insuffi-
ciently democratized and thus statist (155, 349) or bureaucratic (86, 356).  
Radical or unrealizable as they be in the eyes of  some, these delineated 
delimitations and principled prohibitions arguably proceed, as a matter of  rational 
course, from Dardot and Laval’s central premise: that a new model of  society, de-
rived from and sustained by a new meta-principle of  which ‘the common’ remains 
the most promising and viable on offer, can and must establish a new ‘reason,’ ca-
pable of  undoing and ‘overthrowing’ the contemporary neoliberal order. 
Beneath Common’s theoretical offerings lies something additionally sub-
stantive that must also command its readers’ attention: an expansive outline and 
analysis of  ancient, medieval, and modern historical developments that together 
bear directly on the origins and evolution of  the European idea and practice of  ‘the 
common.’ The book’s first part, “The Emergence of  the Common,” for instance, 
outlines the modern segment of  these developments, reconstructing and critiquing 
the histories of  the communist idea and state communism (Chapter 2); the period 
of  the post-1980 neoliberal-era ‘new global commons enclosures’ (Chapter 3); post-
WWII American inquiry into different types of  ‘goods,’ which culminates in the 
liberal neo-institutionalist political economy research of  Eleanor Ostrom, whose 
work documents successful examples of  non-state, non-market, rule-based com-
mon pool resource, governance (Chapter 4); and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s 
early twenty-first-century attempts at translating “a theory of  the commons into a 
theory of  the common [italics in the original]” (32).  
Common’s second part then goes still further back, recovering classical, me-
dieval, and modern aspects of  the history of  the law and the institution of  the com-
mon, including, but by no means limiting itself  to, (Chapter 6) Ancient Greek 
conceptions of  ‘commoning’ as an activity (koinônein) and ‘the common’ as an in-
stitution (koinôn); Ancient Roman distinctions between the Public Domain, State 
Property, and Res Nullius, or the ‘unappropriable’; (Chapter 7) the discontinuous 
history of  English Common Law, in which ‘custom’ functions as a site of  conflict 
rather than of  certainty; (Chapter 8) the “irreducible heterogeneity of  the customs 
of  the poor” in early modern Europe, and the notion that their legal foundations 
lay in productive ‘activity’; and (Chapter 9) the complex and primarily French mid-
nineteenth to early twentieth-century customary and institutional construction of  
de facto workers’ commons. Chapter 10, which belongs to the book’s second part, 
then uses ideas developed by Jean-Paul Sartre and Cornelius Castoriadis to transcend 
sociology’s Comte-inspired “Reduction of  the Institution to the Instituted,” by rea-
soning an “Instituent Praxis,’ whose bases, as previously noted, lie in a ‘Co-Institu-
tion of  Rules.’ 
Notwithstanding its depth and breadth, Common is by no means free of  
weaknesses. Some are technical: its font is excessively small and conceals the book’s 
true length, which far exceeds its official page count; its table of  contents leaves 
out the book’s clarifying chapter sub-headings; it lacks both a bibliography and an 
index. Other weaknesses are analytical. Might its conception of  ‘the common’ be 
judged excessively constructivist, or insufficiently materialist? Does the book’s pri-
mary focus on elaborating a ‘reason’ contrary to neoliberalism mean that it targets 
the wrong adversary, or merely one of  a potential number that must ultimately be 
addressed in tandem? Further, though driven by a powerful and scintillating intelli-
gence, does its seemingly secular spirit bear the implicit imprint of  a decidedly 
French, and thus conceivably provincial, rationalism? Still other weaknesses, or per-
haps oversights or omissions, could be said to be praxiological in nature. Dardot 
and Laval communicate nothing concrete as to how ‘the common’ is to be instituted 
in a world in which legal services are overwhelmingly beyond the financial reach of  
most individuals and groups.  
Moreover, their conception of  commoning as co-decision and co-activity 
appears to depend on making a premature processual leap over practical pedagogical 
questions concerning the education and consciousness formation of  would-be com-
moners. Given its demanding theoretical and historical content, the sustained en-
gagement of  which approximates challenges associated with completing an 
advanced graduate level university course, this gap in Common is odd and unusual. 
Further, they remain largely silent throughout their book’s many pages about ques-
tions concerning commoning and technology.  
Nonetheless, despite these concerns Common remains a book of  singular 
value, possessed of  many virtues: an impeccable structure; remarkable lucidity; rig-
orous scholarship; patiently sustained theoretical argument; and profound historical 
and geographical scope. Besides, Matthew MacLellan’s translation of  it offers Eng-
lish readers a special boon: effective access to the large and troublingly untranslated 
French and Italian literatures Dardot and Laval consistently engage with and cite. 
In his preface to Common the Canadian scholar and thinker Imre Szeman declares 
the work “possibly the best account of  the communal idea that exists in a single 
book” (x). A year later, there is little reason to doubt that his estimation continues 
to hold true.  
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